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Effects of Corporate Governance on Fraud 
Prevention: The Case of Lebanon 
 
Lea F. Chaoul 
 
Abstract 
 
 Fraudulent financial reporting and dishonesty in financial statements decrease 
credibility in audited financial reports. Reducing fraudulent activities can be achieved by 
implementing compliance mechanisms such as good corporate governance practices. 
Recent studies concluded that corporate governance structures should be improved in 
developing countries, particularly in Lebanon where corporate governance is weak in 
terms of application. This study aims to determine fraud prevention impacted by 
corporate governance dimensions, transparency of financial data and ownership 
structures, efficiency of the board of directors, and proactive corporate social 
responsibility measures and audit committee initiatives .This survey-based study uses 
data collected from employees working in different Lebanese corporations and who are 
familiar with corporate governance structures and financial performances the companies. 
Data analysis shows that the effectiveness and independence of the board of directors 
followed by the audit committee effectiveness, and the transparency of financial data 
have the highest impact on limiting fraudulent activities. 
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Chapter I 
 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE & FRAUD 
 
This chapter consists of an overview and background of corporate governance, 
the study need, the research problem, the relevance of the study and the limitation for the 
study. 
 
1.1 Overview and Background 
The concept of corporate governance is a worldwide phenomenon that has 
gained great momentum ever since corporate scandals of bankruptcy erupted during the 
early 2000’s. The Corporate governance’s importance was amplified in 1998 when the 
financial crisis erupted in Russia, Asia and Brazil (Claessens & Horen, 2006). Later on, 
corporate governance practices were used in the United States and Europe. This practice 
drove many corporations out of business (Claessens et al., 2006). The economic 
disasters lead to good corporate governance implementation which in turn will achieve a 
strong economic base (Becht, Bolton, & Roell, 2003). In fact, corporate scandals were 
the main driver for eliciting changes in corporate governance practices (United Nations, 
1999). Corporate governance describes the relation between a company’s chief 
executive officer, shareholders, board of directors, and stakeholders (employees, 
creditors, suppliers, customers), and the extent to which the board monitors the manager. 
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Moreover, corporate governance controls the board of directors’ degree of accountability 
to the shareholders and the company (Arjoon, 2005). Good corporate governance 
positively impacts the firm itself, the whole marketplace and the entire company 
(Claessens et al., 2006).  
The board of directors supervises management using corporate governance 
practices which guarantees tactical supervision and useful administration. The board is 
considered liable to the corporation and its stakeholders (Cornford, 2010). Even though, 
corporate governance has no single definition, Cadbury states that it is a system which 
structures, operates and controls a company with the ultimate objective to satisfy 
shareholders and creditors. It also takes care of employees’ interests, maintains 
outstanding relations with customers and suppliers, and properly complies with the 
regulatory mandates and requirements (Cadbury, 2000). When firms exercise corporate 
governance, companies will outperform their competitors since there is a strong 
relationship between abiding to corporate governance practices and firm’s value 
(Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003). There is a link of causality between corporate 
governance and a small interest of capital, high yield on investment, high productivity 
and better treat for shareholders. However, the direction of causality isn’t always 
transparent (Claessens et al., 2006). Corporate governance specifies the ones who are in 
charge of corporate decisions, the categories of the decisions to be made and the 
distribution of resources and revenues (O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Corporate governance’s five dimensions contribute to fraud prevention. The 
fives dimensions were as follows: transparency of financial data, ownership structure, 
board of directors and management, corporate social responsibility and audit committee 
(Dahawy, 2007). Those cited tools contribute to fraud prevention in corporations. This 
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study aims to test the tools of corporate governance in the Lebanese market and how it 
impacts fraud. There is little research on corporate governance application in Lebanon. 
Implementation of good corporate governance is not easy because many small and 
medium size enterprises manage their corporation alone and do not follow the general 
corporate governance’s rules and regulation (El-Kassar, Messarra & Elgammal, 2015). 
The disclosure of information in Lebanon is low (Elgammal, Assad & Jourdi 2014). 
There is a need to ameliorate corporate governance practices in order to monitor the 
chances of fraud in Lebanon. 
 
1.2 Need for the Study 
Fraud may be defined as planned dishonesty and stealing committed against: 
depositors, creditors, clients or government and others (Weirich & Reinstein, 
2000).Corporate governance is important for the development and growth of all 
organizations. Also, corporate governance structure should be improved in developing 
countries. In developed economies, corporate governance insures the movement of 
investments to organizations and the return of income to lenders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In Lebanon, corporate governance’s role is undervalued because it is not 
implemented by the legal rules and regulations. 
Now that we understand that corporate governance is a must to every company in 
order to succeed, the aim of this thesis is the test the relationship of corporate 
governance’s dimensions with fraud. Fraudulent financial reporting and dishonesty 
cause a decline in investors’ confidence in audited financial reports. The function of 
corporate governance’s dimensions which evolved significantly during the last three 
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decades is one example of compliance tools promoting a strong governance base in 
organizations. Many recent studies conducted in developing countries prove that there is 
a must to ameliorate corporate governance structure. This research examines the 
likelihood of corporate governance to prevent and detect fraud in companies. First, 
Audit committee, board of directors, and management constitute the corporate 
governance members. Second, audit committee is very important in corporate 
governance. Audit committee identifies, display and regulate the business practices of 
the company. They assure effective management procedures. Then, the board of 
directors is a stakeholder in the company so the interest between its members which 
leads to conflicts. The audit committee is highly needed in order to control and limit 
such conflict between the members of boards of directors. Moreover, management has a 
major duty to fairly control the interaction between stakeholders. If management 
succeeds to allow what is beneficial and restricts what might harm the common interest 
of the organization, it will diminish the likelihood of fraud. Also, corporate social 
responsibility reduces the waste disposed to the society as a whole which in turn 
decreases fraud.  
Finally, transparency of financial data eliminates the likelihood of fraud 
occurrence. All of the mentioned members work in collaboration in order to avoid fraud. 
SAS No. 82 states that there are 2 fraud types: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. Fraudulent financial reporting is called management fraud 
that is aimed to embellish the financial statements. Management Fraud is when the 
administration tries to embellish reported gains and overstates assets and revenues or to 
understates expenses and liabilities. Misappropriation of assets, also called employees 
fraud, is when employees steal cash or other assets from the organization. 
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By finding that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
fraud, an advanced research is needed to examine the Lebanese case. This thesis will 
show whether there is a direct versus an indirect or positive versus negative relation 
between corporate governance and fraud. Moreover, recommendation and advices 
concluded from this research will be offered to readers who will use the provided 
information. The Lebanese society should take benefits of such information and work 
hard to ameliorate the actual situation. The Lebanese society faces fraud in its 
organizations so there is a need to work on testing corporate governance dimensions. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
Specialists in the management accounting major recommend that the company’s 
corporate governance test the existence of fraud and control for it. In particular, 
corporations face a significant amount of fraud in the structure. Research testing the 
relationship between fraud and corporate governance proves that corporate governance 
and its structure contribute to achieve less fraud. The Lebanese institution faces the 
problem of weak corporate governance which leads to fraud problem. The Lebanese 
society faces many internal complications such as the lack of political strategies that 
control corporate governance, and the size of the company that might not afford the 
corporate governance structure. Other problems could be the political and social 
problems, the lack of fraud testing instrument and improper handling of employees who 
commit fraud.  
Also, a good corporate governance application minimizes fraud occurrence that’s 
why the Lebanese companies should try to ameliorate corporate governance in general. 
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After applying corporate governance in Lebanon, a study of how corporate governance 
components lead to less fraud should be conducted.  
 
1.4 Research Objective & Relevance of the study 
The Research objective is to examine how corporate governance dimensions 
achieve less fraudulent financial reporting in corporation. After finding how corporate 
governance and fraud are related, it is essential to which corporate governance 
dimension impacts fraudulent financial reporting the most.At the end of the research a 
highlight of positive relationship between corporate governance structure that are: 
transparency of financial data, ownership structure, board of directors, corporate social 
responsibility, audit committee on one hand and fraud occurrence on the other hand. 
This study will constitute a good base for reference and further research. Corporate 
governance implementation is weak in Lebanon. Also, fraud is Lebanon is very 
widespread and there is a bad reputation about Lebanese companies.In Lebanon, this 
study should be used in order to ameliorate the actual case and implement corporate 
governance. Also, it contributes to fraud prevention in Lebanese companies. Thus, it 
affects the credibly of the Lebanese market as a whole. After finding how corporate 
governance practices help avoiding fraud, it should be noted that there is always kind of 
limitation to the study.  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
The research constituted of 115 surveys whereby 80 responded and 75 were 
actually usable so it is a small sample. It is a convenient sample. The questions test the 
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different point of view of companies in Lebanon. Moreover, the employees who 
responded to the surveys needed to know about corporate governance topic. Some 
employees were uninterested by the study and simply ignored the surveys. International 
studies tackled a similar issue of low respondents because employees fear to report any 
type of fraud because reporting fraud incorporation might cause punishment by the 
higher level managers. While collecting the data, employees’ were hesitant to report 
fraud in the company where they work. The low response rate is a limitation to the 
study. Moreover, there was another limitation, that is, the uninterested employees which 
made the data collection a more complex process. Then, collecting data from employees 
was time consuming. Another limitation of this research is that it relied only on the 
opinion of the Lebanese market leaders without taking into consideration any other area. 
Finally, other factors can be included such as code of ethics and government regulation. 
Before delving into the research, it is important to look at previous studies on corporate 
governance and fraud. 
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Chapter II 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
This chapter includes: a literature review of corporate governance, transparency 
of financial data, board of directors, ownership structure, corporate social responsibility, 
audit committee and fraud. Moreover, a list of hypotheses to be tested is also included in 
this section. The literature review includes the relationship between corporate 
governance dimensions including: transparency of financial data, board of directors, 
ownership structure, corporate social responsibility and audit committee on one hand 
and fraud occurrence on the other hand. 
  
2.1 Literature Review 
 In the following, a view of previous studies of corporate governance, its 
dimensions, and its influence on fraudulent financial reporting will be presented. 
 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance 
A good corporate governance structure is required in order to protect 
stakeholders' investments (D’Silva & Ridely, 2007). The worldwide expanding market 
and the change in the companies’ ownership structures also require good corporate 
governance structure (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). A Cadbury’s corporate 
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governance report testing the late 80’s crisis costs and causes for companies’ 
liquidations, defined corporate governance as scheme which administers and gears the 
organizations. This scheme represents the board of directors who are elected by the 
companies’ shareholders (Cadbury Report, 1992). Similarly, OECD that handed out the 
principles of corporate governance states that corporate governance achieves a strong 
basis in order to reach the organization’s objective and control its transactions. OECD 
also states that all stakeholders should collaborate to achieve a good company’s 
performance (OECD, 2004). 
An international movement for creating rules and standards for a good corporate 
governance erupted. Corporate governance encouraged governmental and specialized 
companies to publish a number of reports and researches. Those movements pushed 
companies to create corporate governance rules and standards. The LCCG (2006) issued 
by the Lebanese Transparency Association concluded that a well governed organization 
achieves a better internal governance structure which insures higher profits for the 
company. LCCG attracts investors and allows the company to achieve higher returns 
(LCCG, 2006). LCCG, which mostly studies the Lebanese joint stock, associates 
classifications and explanations from different global best governance applications for 
example the OECD. The LCCG states that corporate governance is structure which 
oversees and supervises the firm. This code also assesses the job of those who are 
accountable for directing and controlling management (LCCG, 2006). The LCCG was 
also used as a base for other codes in the MENA area. 
Another corporate governance definition states that corporate governance is the 
procedure that administer and controls firms globally (Gao & Cling, 2008). Most of 
these descriptions consider the board of directors, audit committee, transparency of 
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financial data, ownership structure, and corporate social responsibility as the dimensions 
for good corporate governance structure. 
The lack of corporate governance structure will lead to fraud (Mensah, Addo & 
Buatsi, 2003). Companies who implement corporate governance in its structures are less 
likely to face fraudulent financial activities (Belay, 2007). Global corporations became 
more interested about corporate governance topic (Khanchel, 2007). It was concluded by 
Campos & Coricelli (2002) that in Eastern Europe and Africa, investors are willing to 
pay a premium up to 30% for corporations having good corporate governance. Similarly, 
a study conducted in Lebanon showed that more than 84% of international investors 
prefer to invest in a company having strong corporate governance and pay more for its 
share but are reluctant to invest in companies having the same financial situation with no 
corporate governance structure (LCCG, 2006). The LCCG states that the Lebanese 
corporations started using new governance structures to attract investors instead of 
pushing them away for investment. In addition, there are many points of views that 
tackle the number of contributors to corporate governance. The Guidance for Auditors 
specified that the corporate governance structure includes the board of directors, the 
management and audit committee (IIA, 2006). Some researches stated that the board of 
directors and the audit committee alone compose the governance structure of a company 
(Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Gramling, 2004).  
First, researchers found that there is a link between corporate governance and the 
board of directors. According to the King II principals, the board of director’s 
independence is the number one principal that proves the existence of strong corporate 
governance within the organization (OECD, 2004). Also, board independence is crucial 
in overseeing and controlling the firm’s management. The board members have to be 
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ready for unscheduled meetings in case of emergency such as the need for high 
supervision and control (Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004).  The king II report states that 1 to 
4 board meetings should be done yearly for the purpose of assuring a good control of the 
company’s transactions (OECD, 2002). So, the board of directors has an important role 
in the firm’s governance. On the other hand, strong governance relies on other factors 
and dimensions. 
The section above tackles the notion of corporate governance and its history. It is 
a must to identify the main attributes that measure board of directors’ effectiveness. 
Improving those attributes participates in the development of the practices of corporate 
governance. Therefore, it is a must to find the mechanisms and tools that are directly 
linked to each dimension of corporate governance. 
 Due to the large amount of companies’ failure in the 80s combined with other 
factors, corporations became more interested in corporate governance practices. 
Particularly, business stakeholders are stressing the importance of applying corporate 
governance in order to protect their investments (D’Silva & Ridely, 2007). A more 
specific explanation defines corporate governance as the management and control of 
corporation around the globe (Gao et al.2008). Many arrangements state that the board 
of directors and the audit committee are the base for a good corporate governance 
performance. Other classifications such as The King II principals states that board of 
directors independence is the number one criteria that reflects a good corporate 
governance (OECD, 2002). Therefore, the boards of directors have an important part in 
corporate governance structure. After defining corporate governance and its dimensions, 
each one of these components will be thoroughly discussed.  
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2.1.2 Transparent Financial Data 
Transparent financial data is a requirement for every company in order to survive 
in the long run. The Capital market uses corporate governance to assure that their 
financial reports are transparent (Rezaee, 2002). Transparency of financial data means 
that every transaction should be reported as it is regardless of its value. Usually, the 
accountant’s work is reviewed by auditors. Transparent financial statements show the 
gains and losses incurred and paid. It is the stakeholders’ right to have accurate financial 
information in their hands. The company should work internally and externally in order 
to make such financial statements available.  
Financial statement transparency was interpreted as the appropriateness and 
timeliness of financial statements disclosure and their analysis by outsiders (Bushman, 
Piotroski & Smith, 2004). Financial reporting standards are defined as an array of 
commonly used framework and regulations used in the creation of financial statement. 
Those commonly agreed upon standards permit a corporation to disclose information to 
investors whether potential or existing ones. It also helps management and other 
stakeholders in making some company related decisions.  
Financial transparency allows stakeholders to easily comprehend the company’s 
financials. Transparency of financial data has an important role in retrieving capital and 
lowering the cost of borrowing capital because it lowers information risk such as the loss 
due to lack of information or vagueness. Then, allowing employees’ access to financials 
will create a feeling of ownership and commitment which in turn reduces fraud. When 
deciding on a company’s budget, transparency of financial data necessitates clearness, 
accuracy and extensiveness (Tomann, 2000). Transparent financial data guarantees 
shareholders’ right and profits (Atabey & Çetin, 2012). Corporate transparency requires 
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the use of internationally accepted principals and other useful accounting principles for 
example the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Atabey & Cetin., 
2012).  
Good Corporate governance practices are perceived as a preventer of capital 
waste, assurer of financial data transparency, supervisor of business transaction, and 
provider of social responsibility (Atabey & Cetin., 2012). Transparent financial data is a 
tactic that pushes people, administration, workplace and governments to be accountable 
for their transactions (Atabey & Cetin., 2012). In this framework, transparent financial 
data are described as management revelation of all financial information based on which 
their job will be judged by the public (Florini, 1999). 
 
2.1.3 Board of Directors  
Elected members of the board of directors cooperate and oversee the business 
operations. The Board of directors is also called board of governors, board of managers, 
board of regents, board of trustees, and board of visitors. The stockholders of the 
company are represented by the board of directors who are interested in increasing the 
profit to the highest level possible. They try to motivate stakeholders in order to increase 
profits while assuring a good company reputation. They play a major role in fraud 
prevention. A successful board of directors achieves the organization’s prosperity. They 
measure and influence the company by recognizing, detecting and using controlling 
fraud risk program (McNeal, 2011). The Board of directors nominates the CEO or 
general manager of the company and defines the track and business plan of the 
company. The CEO or general manager hires the staff and supervises their daily 
business transactions. Usually problems and conflicts begin when employees override 
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the rules and regulations. Conflicts also arise when directors interfere in every daily 
business transaction. On the other hand, management is not the only one authority to 
dictate the rules and decisions of the corporation but also the board of directors appoints 
officers for the board. The office of the president, also called the chair of the board is the 
most important office. The main Board of directors’ roles are as follows:  Employ new 
people, oversee transaction, retain employees, assess employee’s performance 
,compensate managers ,create directions for the company, Oversee the Company and the 
relationship with the CEO,  and control Fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the 
company’s assets and shares. The Board of directors’ roles also include: Screening and 
regulating the company’s business functions. 
 
2.1.4 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is defined as the dispersal of equity ownership. A 
company’s ownership structure is defined as equity sharing in relation with capital and 
votes. It is a vital corporate component upon which incentives are distributed to directors 
who make decisions regarding the company’s financial efficiency. When shares 
ownership is independent, directors are able to control the firm more accurately and 
make better decisions (Heubischl, 2006).  The ownership structure of a company is the 
endogenous result of shareholders’ business choice (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Ownership structure has huge effect on corporate governance application (Shleifer & 
Vinshy, 1997). Limited liability corporations are more competent than proprietorships 
when it comes to splitting losses and risks.  Corporate form of organization permits the 
organization to enlarge and increase capital from different stakeholders (Cole & Wuh 
2000).There is a positive connection between ownership structure and stakeholders’ 
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worth and profitability. The holders of large numbers of shares influence the company’s 
tactic and effort (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). The joint work of management and 
shareholders could lead to conflict in the company. This joint work could lead to what is 
called agency theory but sometimes, large number of owners influences the 
administration by minimizing diversification and maximizing profits (Jensen, 1986). 
Ownership structure and company’s performance are directly related. However, when 
ownership concentration reaches its limit, it will affect the company’s performance 
negatively (Morck,Shleifer & Vishny ,1988). In addition, there are two types of 
ownership structures: one with voting right and the other without voting right. The 
ownership structure discloses the owners of the corporation’s equity. Large Corporations 
have the problem of highly dispersed ownership structure and that’s what separates 
ownership right and controls right of shareholders (Demstez &lehn, 1985).  
 
2.1.5 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), called social citizenship, is when the 
company takes responsibility of the effects of its products on the environment. It is a 
recent topic of interest to the public (Huang, 2010). Companies interested in corporate 
social responsibility are considered ecofriendly. These companies use the 3R’s that is 
reduce, reuse and recycle. Corporate social responsibility cares not only about itself but 
also about the society as a whole (Griesse, 2005). Corporate social responsibility 
contributes to the efficient use of the limited economic resources. An effective Corporate 
Social Responsibility takes into consideration many factors including the consumers, the 
staff, the dealers, the public, and the situation. Corporate Social Responsibility should be 
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applicable in small and large corporations (Thornton, 2008). It pushes employees to 
abide by the rules, regulations and ethics and that’s what assures a better life quality. 
However, the opponents of Corporate Social Responsibility suggest that a 
corporation should ignore Corporate Social Responsibility because doing so is more 
beneficial for the company (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2011). No business will adopt 
Corporate Social Responsibility unless there is a direct or indirect benefit for the 
corporation itself. This is most important in developing countries. A company can 
ameliorate the society’s needs by creating employment opportunities, developing the 
social standards, and creating goods that make employees’ life easier. CSR is a proactive 
approach that overcomes the business protocol of making profits and abiding by the law 
(Wicks & Harrison, 2013). Even though there are many factors that push to apply CSR, 
it is still not fully applicable because it is not fully comprehended (Freeman & Hasnaoui, 
2011).Corporations need to follow the rules and regulations of Corporate Social 
Responsibility which is required by the Canadian government (Hasselback, 2014). CSR 
planning is a challenge to managers because of the conflict of interest between them and 
the company. Being socially responsible allows the corporation to gain a better relation 
with stakeholders and ameliorate the company’s reputation (Tuan, 2011). It is easier for 
large corporations to apply Corporate Social Responsibility because they possess the 
needed resources, but it is harder for smaller corporations. Corporate Social 
Responsibility pushes businesses to use their conscience while doing business (Legg’s, 
2014). In order to survive in the competitive business environment, companies must be 
engaged in the society (Legg’s, 2014). CSR assures a good reputation for the 
corporation who applies it in its systems (Zulhamri & Yuhanis, 2013). Some forms of 
corporate social responsibility are sponsorship, environment care and financing 
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important events (Mitchell R, 1992). CSR implies that companies consider themselves 
accountable for the result of their transactions on the public and the society. CSR 
embraces four major parts: instrumental which implement a plan to assure profits, 
political which is used in order to achieve political goals, integrative which is created to 
achieve the societal needs, and ethical which is used to apply the company’s duty toward 
the society. Corporate social performance (CSP) helps to examine the performance and 
the application of corporate social responsibility (Huang, 2010). In order to maximize 
the company’s profits, a company must combine all the stakeholders’ interest and satisfy 
them (Jensen, 2002). There two types of stakeholders: primary stakeholders are those 
whose existence affects the performance of the corporation; if one of the secondary 
stockholders involved isn’t satisfied, they would leave for the sake of other 
opportunities, and that’s what affects the company negatively (Clarkson, 1995). 
Therefore, in order to retain employees, managers should treat them fairly. 
 
2.1.6 Audit Committee 
The Audit committee is a working board of directors that works with financial 
reporting. It should be active in order to be effective (Menon & Williams, 1994). The 
Audit committee is composed of the board of director’s member, and its job is to review 
financial statements process, pick outside auditors and receive interior and exterior 
transactions. It increases the credibility and quality of auditing (Piot & Janin, 2007).  
The Audit committee’s job is to help in diminishing fraud occurrence. Misleading 
financial statements are disclosed by the coordinated work of external and internal 
auditors (McMullen, 1996). In the capital market, the audit committee’s job is very 
important because it protects stakeholders by reviewing the financial statements process 
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and procedures.  Moreover , the audit committee is not only responsible for  financial 
statement reviewing but also for appointing , compensating , overseeing, commanding 
and augmenting knowledge and experience of the employees (Lander & Auger, 2008). 
External auditors, internal auditors, managers, audit committee and the board of 
directors are all individuals who are responsible for the company’s corporate 
governance. In a corporation, the board appoints the managers who are responsible to 
overlook the agreed upon company’s goal. For the financial statement to be published 
publicly, it should be transparent and accurate. The financial statement is prepared by 
the internal auditors which will make it easier for external auditors’ review. The top 
accounting companies who are considered to have the biggest market share provide 
large number of external auditors. These companies include Ernest and Young, Price 
Water House Cooper, Deloitte and Touch and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler. Those 
companies insure the accuracy and transparency of financial statements. The external 
auditors are outsiders who visit the company to validate the accuracy and accountability 
of the financial statements. The significance of corporate governance becomes important 
when one considers its effect on fraud. 
 
2.1.7 Fraud  
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE), fraud 
includes 3 types which are assets misappropriation, corruption and financial statements 
fraud. First, assets misappropriation includes money and inventory taken to the 
employee’s own pocket. Then, corruption includes bribery that is when the customer 
pays money for the job to be done. Bribery includes kickbacks which is the commission 
18 
 
taken by employees in order to perform the job and bid rigging which is the payment of 
money to get the bid.  
Moreover, corruption includes conflict of interest, economic extortion and illegal 
gratuities. Conflict of interest is when the employee hires or helps one of his family 
members or friends and this is not directly related to money. Then, economic extortion is 
when employees ask for money to finish their jobs. Finally, illegal gratuities are when 
customers give a present for an employee to perform the job. Finally, financial 
statements fraud is an intentional deception and falsification of financial statements. 
Financial statements fraud is the topic of this research paper. It is done usually by 
collusion among management, employees or third party (Zimbelman & Albrecht, 2012). 
 Fraud occurs when management tries to overstate its revenues or assets by 
augmenting assets and profits or decreasing expenses and liabilities to ameliorate the 
current financial situation. Fraud is deceit that is done by stakeholders which includes 
creditors, customers and other users (Weirich & Reinstein, 2000). Many corporations 
went bankrupt because of fraudulent action conducted by managers. Fraud is costly for 
corporations, and it affects companies of all sizes and occurs in a variety of industries. 
The case of Enron is the best example of the company which went bankrupt because of 
the misrepresentation of the financial statements. Thus, corporate governance is a way to 
detect and diminish fraudulent acts in financial reporting.  
 Many studies were conducted to examine the effects of corporate governance on 
fraud prevention. The reasons behind fraud are clarified by Albrecht et al. (1994) who 
stated that the factors influencing fraud are as follows: the situational pressure which is a 
low income and a hard work, the plausible opportunity that is the lack of regulations and 
rationalization which is viewed as plausible but false reasons (Moyes & Hasan, 1996).  
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 The BBCI and Enron are an illustration of company’s disasters. The BCCI storm 
of July 1991 was attributed to involvement of top management and other parties in 
fraudulent loans and playing with financial statements (Vanasco, 1998). This latter drove 
to an international lawsuits because investors wanted to recover their investments on one 
hand and the ones who committed fraud were imprisoned (Truell & Gurwin, 1992).In 
addition, the failure of the English Baring Bank in February 1995 was attributed to the 
unlawful and unapproved transactions of Nick Leeson who is a trader in Singapore. 
Leeson deceived the public by showing that the bank was earning high profits but in 
reality, it was incurring huge losses (Drummond, 2002). Leeson pushed Baring Bank, 
which is considered a very prestigious English bank, out of business with almost £850 
million as debts (Strategic Direction, 2002). Moreover, the failure of Enron in 2001 
resulted in the collapse of Arthur Anderson auditing company (Vinten, 2003). The case 
of Enron is a sample of the fraudulent activities committed while both management and 
auditors were aware of it. The tread way Commission clarifies fraud as a planned act , 
by adding or removing financial information, that creates deceptive financial statement 
(Lutz, 2015).  
 Beasley (1996) stated that outside board members limits the probability of 
fraudulent financial statements. Also, he stated that an audit committee alone does not 
affect the likelihood of fraud occurrence. However, it can be concluded that audit 
committee’s performance is determined by the way the audit committee operates. Thus, 
an effective audit committee will assure less fraudulent financial reporting. Independent 
audit committee who meet at least 2 times per year will face less fraudulent financial 
reporting (Abbott et al., 2000). Sometimes, audit committee’s judgement for fraud may 
depend on internal auditors’ data because audit committee lack information based on 
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which they can make an independent judgement. According to Cox & Weirich (2002), 
the burden of complying or exceeding analysts’ expectations may push companies to 
fraudulent activities. Usually, the CEO contributes to inflating gains or hiding liabilities 
in the company’s financial statements and this is the case of Enron (Vinten, 2003).  
  Fraud is a costly problem for organizations (Burnaby, Abdol Mohammadi, Hass, 
Sarens & Allegrini, 2009), which affects companies of all sizes and occurs in a variety 
of industries (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Neal, 2010). Traditionally, each business 
is always susceptible to internal fraud or corruption from its management and non-
management employees (Phua, Lee, Smith & Gayler, 2010). For users of financial 
reports to perceive effective protection from fraudulent reporting, they should believe 
that any attempted fraud can be detected and reported (James, 2003). Organizations that 
discover fraud, including embezzlement, asset misappropriation, and manipulation of 
financial statements are usually surprised that the incident occurred and the auditors 
failed to uncover it (O’Reilly-Allen & Zikmund, 2009). Hemraj (2004) has also 
explained fraudulent behavior as a deliberate step made by one or more individuals to 
deceive or mislead with the objective of misappropriation of assets, distorting an 
organization’s apparent financial performance or strength to outsiders, or otherwise 
obtaining an unfair advantage. It encompasses white-collar crime, defalcation, 
irregularities, and embezzlement.  
 Furthermore, corruption is an action that is penalized by law in many countries. 
The Penalty for committing fraud depends on the country where the fraud is committed. 
Corruption takes many forms such as bribery, embezzlement, theft, extortion and 
blackmail. Wide spread example of corruption is bribery. Fraud injures organizations 
and it affects the company socially, politically and ethically. Countries around the globe 
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are investing effort to combat corruption (Argandona, 2003). Individuals who are 
interested in social control and domination are less aware of fraud because their concern 
is more focused on power which can be a kind of manipulation to others (Rosenblatt, 
2012). Theft is another type of corruption that occurs in organizations and affects all 
levels of employees starting from the CEO extending to gatekeepers; it leads 3 out of 4 
organizations out of business (Scjaefer, Trigilio, Negus & Ro, 2000). 
Blackmail, one of the many methods of corruption has led pharmaceutical 
organization to less corporate creation and improvement (Miles, Munilla & Covin, 
2002). When the same person is at the same time manager and owner, there is a higher 
probability of corruption than when the owner and the manager are different persons 
(Ramdani & Witteloosuijn, 2011). Corruption is a widespread threat to organizations 
that weakens competitive advantage (Boukouras & Koufopoulos, 2015). In the case 
where board of directors comes from diverse background, there is a higher chance of 
corruption which in turn will depreciate shareholder’s equity (Fellow & Safra, 2013).  
Corruption, which is considered normal in some places, can take many forms 
such as despotism, favoritism and selfishness (Esarey, 2013). A diverse board of 
directors will help to achieve higher revenues and appreciated shares (Triana, Miller & 
Tzebiatowski, 2014). Fraud worsens the efficacy of resources which leads to less 
corporate progress (UNDP, 2014). In Indonesia, Citigroup Inc. was banned from 
launching new branches and was sanctioned because of fraud (WSJ, 2011).  
 
2.1.8 Corporate Governance and Fraud   
Razali and Arshad (2014) tackled the issue of corporate governance and its 
relationship with fraudulent reporting, and found that there is a direct positive relation 
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between both. The study was conducted in Malaysian companies during the period of 
2010 -2011. They concluded that corporate governance assures less deceit in financial 
reporting and guarantees more transparent financials. The lack of transparent financial 
data leads to fraudulent financial data which is considered a crime (Rezaee, 2005). 
Corporate governance has pushed auditors and accountants to follow higher standards in 
accounting in order to assure more credible financial statements. 
Dalnial, Kaaluddin, Sanusi and Khairuddin (2014) studied the variations in 
financial ratio between corporations with financial deceit and corporations with no 
financial deceit. They found that there is a huge difference in the financial ratio 
numbers. Also, they went further to test which ratios are more likely to change with 
fraud occurrence. Moreover, they found out that the following ratios such as debt to 
equity, account receivables to sales are the most affected ratios in accounting when there 
is fraud in the financial reports. 
Abdul Rahman and Anwar (2014) proved in their study that there are programs 
and applications used to prevent deceptive financial statements. The study was 
conducted in Malaysia, specifically Malaysian Islamic banking. They learnt that in order 
to prevent fraud, a company should use software to detect them and treat them before 
they become red flags. Also, they proposed that bank settlement, keyword security and 
internal audit are the best ways by which company use its software to detect and prevent 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
Grambling and Myers (2003) suggested that auditors and other employees can 
discover fraud in financial reports and that the audit should also cover the operational 
activities in order to prevent deceptive financial reporting.  
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Companies all over the world face fraud and it may range from single to billions 
of dollars. This may cause bankruptcy on one hand, and employee losing their jobs on 
the other hand, which will negatively effect on the country’s economy as a whole. 
Corporate governance is one way to avoid such consequences. In all companies the main 
aim of the management is to make profit. Some companies may use fraud in order to 
increase their profits, and this is illegal. Management works hard on its team in order to 
detect all traces of theft of the company. In Lebanon, the companies face fraud in their 
financial reporting. For different organizations, a different kind of fraud will take place, 
but the management should be wise while dealing with it. Alzoubi and Selamat (2012) 
suggested that board members are important components in corporate governance 
because these members are in charge of putting the company’s objectives and tactics 
while considering the concern of stakeholders. In addition audit committee plays a role 
in influencing fraud. According to Abbott and Parker (2000), the existence of an audit 
committee that achieves the minimum requirement to be effective and independent will 
lead to less fraudulent financial. Likewise, ownership structure has an impact on 
diminishing fraud. However, a study conducted in China shows that ownership structure 
is insignificant in achieving less fraudulent financial reporting in the corporation (Chen 
& Firth, 2006). 
Moreover, Erturk, Froud, Johal and Williams (2004), stated that corporate 
governance links stockholders and supervision interest by writing a descriptive text 
describing organizational problems and giving solutions. Furthermore, Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2001) claimed that corporate governance requirements diminish the 
propensity of supervisors to manipulate financial and that is more credible in terms of 
financial statements. In Addition, Zhijun (2007) discussed that the data regarding fiscal 
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and operative issue is perceived as an important base for effective corporate governance: 
information release permits unrestricted depositors to control companies, and thus backs 
up investment market expansion. Inspecting is the best tool for data release.  
Not to mention that, fraud is a major problem that most companies face. In 
Lebanon, corporations face fraud because of the irresponsible, greedy and untrustworthy 
management, shareholders or employees. Razali and Arshad (2014), described that 
fraudulent cases had erased the trust towards the fiscal markets, fiscal data and the 
inspection job in general. Dalnial, Kamaluddin, Sanusi and Khairuddin (2014) suggested 
that fraud can take 2 forms: one is misrepresentation of ownership and the second 
misrepresentation of financial statements in order to show that the company is making 
profits and avoiding losses. Rahman, according to Amat, Blake and Dowds (1999), 
suggests that creative accounting is a technique by which employees wisely change the 
financial picture of fiscal reports. Abd Hadi, Paino, Ismail and Dhiyauddin (2014), 
suggested that any individual who will have knowledge about a fraudulent action 
happening will be held responsible for such actions and he/she will be considered either 
an immoral or public violation. 
Those outcomes prove that corporate governance contributes to fraud elimination 
and prevention. The presence of outside board members considerably affect fraud 
occurrence in corporations (Beasley, 1996). Further analysis proved that including 
women in board of directors assures fraud prevention and detection. That’s why the 
corporate governance of any company should be well constructed and well diversified. 
Corporate governance requires a lot of effort and money to be implemented, but it is an 
essential for a company’s success. Implementing corporate governance allows a 
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company’s development and reduces employees’ turnover because the company is more 
regulated.  
Corporate governance ensures success in the long run that’s why companies 
should use all of their resources in order to implement it and erase fraud. In short, all of 
these previously stated articles allowed the understanding the effects of corporate 
governance on fraud detection and inhibition. To enrich our knowledge about this topic, 
questionnaires were distributed to students working in different corporations. Since the 
topic is concerned about the Lebanese society, the knowledge gained from this research 
will be invested in Lebanese work advancement. The purpose of this thesis is to study 
the effect of corporate governance on fraud prevention, in particular the issue of 
corporation. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: in section (2): The 
methodology of the study is presented. Also, a descriptive sample is shown. A 
preliminary analysis of the results is presented in section (3). A discussion, conclusion, 
recommendation and managerial implication are provided. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
As previously stated the main purpose of this study is to examine the compelling 
effects of corporate governance on fraud prevention. Several hypotheses are suggested, 
and they will be examined in this study. 
Audit committees, who are responsible of the precision of financial data, and the 
efficiency of external and internal auditing are all important components of corporate 
governance that lead to less fraud.  A study was conducted by Davies (2009) to test the 
efficacy of audit committee and internal audit when they work together. 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between good corporate governance practices and 
prevention of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Financial data should be reported in their face value regardless of the money’s 
value. Numbers presented in financial statements shouldn’t be understated or overstated. 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between transparency and prevention of fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
Ownership structure determines the ID of the corporation’s equity holders. It 
divides shareholders as voting: there is a positive relationship between ownership and 
prevention of fraudulent financial reporting. 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between ownership and prevention of fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
The board of directors represents the stockholders of the company whose goal is 
to increase profit as much as possible. Boards of directors should be wise enough in 
order to increase their profit while keeping a good reputation for the company. The 
board of directors is an important player who contributes to fraud prevention and 
detection. A keen board will help achieve an increase in the company’s performance. 
Board members can have a quantifiable, positive effect on an organization by 
recognizing, determining and performing a fraud risk controlling program (McNeal, 
2011). 
H1c: There is positive relationship between board of directors and prevention of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
Corporate social responsibility is the extent to which a company cares about the 
exterior environment. Companies should invest part of their profits in order to 
ameliorate the society as a whole. The national public policy requires that employees 
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balance between the shareholders on one side and the environment and employees on the 
other side (Carroll, 1991) 
H1d: There is a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
prevention of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Finally, the audit committee is the board of directors’ members who oversee 
financial reports and disclose them. The importance of the audit committee was 
developed in Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
H1e: There is a positive relationship between audit committee and prevention of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
In chapter III the methodology used will be presented and in chapter IV the data analysis 
will be detailed. 
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Chapter III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used to conduct the data analysis is presented in this chapter. 
The composition of this chapter is as follows: definition of variables, measurement 
methods and techniques, sample data, data collection and statistics. Data is collected 
through questionnaires distributed to students who are employed in various companies 
operating in Lebanon.  
 
3.1 Variables’ Definition 
The measured variables are used to test the hypotheses stated above. The 
questionnaire was designed to measure corporate governance and fraudulent financial 
reporting. They consist of 8 sections whereby the first section tackles the demographics 
of the respondents. Moreover, the demographic sections consist of questions related to 
age, education, gender, years of experience and qualifications. The remaining sections 
tackle corporate governance and fraud. The second section measures the level of 
transparency in the financial statement. The third section examines the level of 
ownership structure and control privileges. The fourth section is about the level of board 
of directors and management in term of risk management and executive versus non-
executive members. The fifth section tackles the level of corporate social responsibility. 
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The sixth section verifies the existence and effectiveness of auditing committee. Finally, 
the seventh examines the usual transactions that most likely face fraud.  
3.2 Measurement Techniques 
The first 15 questions, D 1 to D 15, constitute the demographics section of the 
questionnaire. The second section, TRSS 1 to TRSS 9, is used in order to test 
transparency dimensions.  The third section, OWNS 1 to OWNS 9, test the ownership 
structure dimension. The fourth sections, BRDS 1 to BRDS 19, test the board of 
directors’ dimension. The fifth section, CSRS 1 to CSRS 7, test the corporate social 
responsibility dimension. The sixth section, ADTS 1 to ADTS 9 tests the audit 
committee dimension. The seventh section, FRDS 1 to FRDS 16, tests fraud occurrence.  
Five steps of Likert scale ranging from strongly disagrees to strongly agree are used 
from the second to the seventh section. All the sections are extracted from El-Kassar, 
Elgammal and Bayoud (2014) questionnaires that were used for other studies except for 
the survey questions related to fraud that were self-developed based on research papers 
read such as: (In'airat, 2015) and ( Gramling & Myers, 2003).The questionnaire needed 
10-15 minutes to be answered. 
 
3.3 Sample 
The questionnaire was distributed to alumni and graduate students (MBA, LLM, 
and EMBA) at the Lebanese American University. Out of the 115 surveys distributed, 
80 responded. A total of 75 returned questionnaires were deemed usable. The 
participants were well informed of the purpose of the study. The process was done with 
the utmost confidentiality and anonymity. 
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3.4 Data Collection 
The different items of the questionnaire were used to construct the variables 
measuring the corporate governance dimensions as well as the fraudulent financial 
reporting.. These variables are used to examine how corporate governance dimensions 
contribute to detect and limit fraud. The convenient sampling method was used to collect 
the data. Items related to corporate governance dimensions and fraud were used to 
construct a score based on averaging .To test the hypotheses, scores were constructed 
from each corporate governance dimensions (transparency, ownership structure, board 
of directors and management, corporate social responsibility and audit committee) and 
fraud .These scores are denoted by: 
TRSS is the Transparency of Financial Data Score. 
OWNS is the Ownership Structure Data Score. 
BDRS is the Board of Directors’ Data Score. 
CSRS is the Corporate Social Responsibility Data Score. 
ADTS is the Audit Committee Data Score. 
FDRS is the Fraud Data Score 
These corporate governance scores are used as independent variables while the 
fraud score is the dependent variable. The scores are obtained based on averaging 
responses to items related to each corporate governance dimension as well as those 
related to fraud section. Higher scores indicate better corporate governance practices. 
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Higher fraud scores indicate higher tendencies of fraudulent financial reporting. A copy 
of the questionnaire distributed is provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.5 Statistical Methods 
For the statistical analysis to be done, the different scores are obtained and used 
in order to test the relationship between corporate governance dimensions and fraud 
tendencies. The statistical methods used in the analysis include: Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), regression and correlation, allowed us to explore the relationship between 
corporate governance and fraud. 
In chapter IV the analysis and discussion used will be presented. 
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Chapter IV 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, the statistical methods and techniques used to test the previously 
stated hypotheses are presented. The techniques used are descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, multiple regression, and backward elimination regression. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The various demographic questions are first analyzed. Descriptive analysis 
revealed the following outputs: 
 
Size 
First, the number of employees in  the company is tested and the output of the SPSS is 
presented below. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Table of the Sample Size 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-9 11 14.7 14.7 14.7 
10-19 8 10.7 10.7 25.3 
20-50 14 18.7 18.7 44.0 
> 50 42 56.0 56.0 100.0 
Total 75 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 1: Descriptive Figure of Sample Size 
 
In the table above, the organization size is presented out of 75 companies, 11 are 
between 1 and 9 representing 14.7 % of the sample. Eight companies have between 10 
and 19 employees, representing 10.7 % of the sample. Fourteen companies are between 
20 and 50 representing 18.7% of the sample. Forty-two companies with more than 50 
employees represent 56% of the sample. 
 
Years of Experience 
Second, the years of experience is tested and the SPSS output is presented below. 
Table 2: Descriptive Table of Years of Experience 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <5 years 17 22.7 22.7 22.7 
5-10 years 23 30.7 30.7 53.3 
>10 years 35 46.7 46.7 100.0 
Total 75 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 2: Descriptive Figure of Years of Experience 
 
Companies that have less than 5 years of experience are 17 respondents 
represented 22.7% of the sample.23 respondents have 5 to 10 years of experience 
represented 30.7% of the sample. Finally, those who have more than 10 years of 
experience are 35 companies which represent 46.7% of the sample. 
 
The board size  
Then, the board size is considered and the SPSS output is presented below. 
Table 3: Descriptive Table of Board Size 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-4 12 16.0 16.4 16.4 
5-10 35 46.7 47.9 64.4 
>10 26 34.7 35.6 100.0 
Total 73 97.3 100.0  
Missing System 2 2.7   
Total 75 100.0   
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Figure 3: Descriptive Figure of Board Size 
 
 
16% of the sample is represented by 12 companies which have 1 to 4 board 
members. 35 companies have 5 to 10 boards’ members which represent 46.7% of the 
sample. Finally, large companies that have more than 10 employees were a total of 26 
and represent 34.7% of the sample. 
 
Board of Directors Meeting 
Moreover, the Board of Directors item is tested and the SPSS output is presented below. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Table of Board Meeting 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-3 16 21.3 22.5 22.5 
4-6 25 33.3 35.2 57.7 
>6 30 40.0 42.3 100.0 
Total 71 94.7 100.0  
Missing System 4 5.3   
Total 75 100.0   
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Figure 4: Descriptive Figure of Board Meetings
 
The Board of 16 companies meets between 1 to 3 times annually representing 
21.3 % of the sample. The Board of 25 companies meet between 4 to 6 times yearly 
represents 33.3% of the sample. Finally, 40% of the sample was represented by 30 
companies which their Board meets more than 6 times per year. 
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Sales  
In Addition, Sales is tested and the SPSS results are presented below. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Table of Companies’ Sales 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <100000 8 10.7 11.9 11.9 
100000-499000 20 26.7 29.9 41.8 
500000-1000000 8 10.7 11.9 53.7 
>1000000 31 41.3 46.3 100.0 
Total 67 89.3 100.0  
Missing System 8 10.7   
Total 75 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Descriptive Figure of Companies’ Sales 
 
 10.7% of the sample was represented by 8 companies which have sales of less 
than $ 100,000. Companies that have revenues between $ 100,000-499,000 represent 20 
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respondents equivalent to 26.7% of the sample. Firms that have sales between $ 
500,000-1,000,000 were 8 companies represented 10.7% of the sample. Companies that 
have sales more than $1,000,000 were 31 companies represented 41.3 % of the sample. 
 
Average Annual Sales over the Last 5 Years 
Then, the average annual sales over the last 5 years is tested and the SPSS output is 
presented below 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Table of Change in Sales 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid decreased significantly 3 4.0 4.5 4.5 
decreased slightly 6 8.0 9.0 13.4 
no change 14 18.7 20.9 34.3 
increased slightly 24 32.0 35.8 70.1 
increased significantly 20 26.7 29.9 100.0 
Total 67 89.3 100.0  
Missing System 8 10.7   
Total 75 100.0   
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Figure 6: Descriptive Figure of Change in Sales 
  
 3 companies of which experience a significant decrease in sales in the last five 
years, represents 4% of the sample. 6 companies experience a slight decrease in sales 
over the past 5 years represent 8% of the sample. 14 companies experience no change in 
sales over the past 5 years represents 18.7% of the sample. 24 companies experience a 
slight increase in sales over the past 5 years represent 32% of the sample. 20 companies 
experience a significant increase in sales over the past 5 years represent 26.7% of the 
sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Debt 
Moreover, company debt is tested and the SPSS output is presented below. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Table of Companies’ Debt 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-25% 28 37.3 40.0 40.0 
26-50% 35 46.7 50.0 90.0 
>50% 7 9.3 10.0 100.0 
Total 70 93.3 100.0  
Missing System 5 6.7   
Total 75 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Descriptive Figure of Companies’ Debt 
  
 37.3% of the sample, which is equivalent to 28 companies, has debt that is 
between 1 and 25% of assets. 35 companies have a debt between 26 to 50% represent 
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46.7% of the sample. Those that have a debt greater than 50% were 7 respondents and 
represent 9.3% of the sample. 
 
4.2 Reliability Analysis 
First, statistical analysis were conduct to test the reliability of each component of 
corporate governance and fraud. The output of the five components and fraud are as 
follows. 
 Transparency of Financial Statements 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=TRS1 TRS2 TRS3 TRS4 TRS5 TRS6 TRS7 TRS8 TRS9 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 8: Reliability of Transparency of Financial data and Fraud. 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 75 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 75 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Table 9: Cronbach’s Alpha of Transparency of Financial data 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.939 9 
 
The reliability statistics above shows that Cronbach’s Alpha of transparency is 
0.939 which is greater than the threshold 0.7. Thus, further statistical analysis can be 
conducted. 
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 Ownership Structure 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=OWN1 OWN2 OWN3 OWN4 OWN5 OWN6 OWN7 OWN8 OWN9 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 10: Cronbach’s Alpha of Ownership Structure 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.878 9 
 
The Cronbach’s Alpha for ownership structure is 0.878 which indicated that 
there is a statistical reliability. 
 
 Board of Directors 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=BRD1 BRD2 BRD3 BRD4 BRD5 BRD6 BRD7 BRD8 BRD9 BRD10 
BRD11 BRD12 BRD13 BRD14 BRD15 BRD16 BRD17 BRD18 BRD19 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 11: Cronbach’s Alpha of Board of Directors 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.959 19 
 
Alpha is equal to 0.959 for the board of directors which is above 0.7; therefore, 
additional analysis could be done. 
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 Corporate Social Responsibility 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=CSR1 CSR2 CSR3 CSR4 CSR5 CSR6 CSR7 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 12: Cronbach’s Alpha of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.907 7 
 
The results show a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.907 higher than the threshold 
(0.7) which means that it is reliable. 
 
 Audit Committee 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=ADT1 ADT2 ADT3 ADT4 ADT5 ADT6 ADT7 ADT8 ADT9 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 13: Cronbach’s Alpha of Audit Committee 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.936 9 
 
The value of 0.936 shows that further statistical research can be conducted for 
the audit committee. 
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 Fraud 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=FRD1 FRD2 FRD3 FRD4 FRD5 FRD6 FRD7 FRD8 FRD9 FRD10 
FRD11 FRD12 FRD13 FRD14 FRD15 FRD16 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA. 
 
 
Table 14: Cronbach’s Alpha of Fraud 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.881 16 
 
The statistical reliability of fraud is 0.881 greater than the threshold of Alpha 
which is 0.7. This indicates that further statistical analysis can be concluded.  
 Since all the Chronbach’s Alpha values are way larger than the minimum 
acceptable value of 0.7. From this, we can conclude that the questionnaire is reliable and 
further analysis can be conducted. 
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4.3 Correlation Matrix 
 The correlation analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the 
relationship between corporate governance and fraud. The following results are given in 
table 4.3 
Table 15:  Correlation Matrix 
 
  
The correlation matrix reveals that there is a strong negative correlation between 
the fraud score and each corporate governance score.  The scores vary from -0.376 to -
0.447. The least effect corresponding the relationship between fraud and CSR followed 
by Ownership and Fraud (-0.391). Both correlation coefficients of these relationships are 
below the -0.4 level. all the correlation of corporate governance and fraud are significant 
at 0.01 .Hence, the results support hypotheses H1a to H1e. 
From this, a good practice to reduce fraud is to enhance corporate governance 
practices. In particular, the above table shows that Board of Directors practices have the 
highest influence on reducing fraud practices with a -0.447 score. The Audit Committee 
with a score of -0.435 also has a positive influence on reducing fraud after the board of 
Correlation Matrix
TRSS OWNS BRDS CSRS ADTS FRDS
TRSS  1.000 
OWNS  .523  1.000 
BRDS  .654  .534  1.000 
CSRS  .567  .385  .735  1.000 
ADTS  .694  .590  .663  .629  1.000 
FRDS  -.415  -.391  -.447  -.376  -.435  1.000 
75 sample size
± .227  critical value .05 (two-tail)
± .296  critical value .01 (two-tail)
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directors. The transparency of financial data occupies the third place in reducing fraud 
practices with a -0.415 score. The least influencing factors of corporate governance on 
fraud practices are Ownership Structure with a score of -0.391 and Corporate Social 
Responsibility with a score of -0.376.  
According to the correlation analysis traced, financial reporting is impacted the 
most by the board independence and effectiveness. This was consistent with the study 
done by Beasley (1996) which indicated that the presence of outside board members 
decreases fraud occurrence in corporations. Then, the effectiveness of audit committee 
also decreases fraud but to a lesser extent of than that of board of independence and 
effectiveness. This was consistent with the study of Abbott and Parker (2000) signifying 
that an effective and independent audit committee assures less fraudulent financial 
reporting. Effective of audit committee is followed by the transparency of the financial 
reporting influencing in terms of decreasing fraudulent acts. This was consistent with the 
study done by Rezaee (2005) who indicated that the lack of transparent financial data 
leads to fraudulent financial data which is considered a crime. These dimensions of 
corporate governance are important to limit fraudulent activities since they are directly 
tied to overseeing, controlling and monitoring the financial activities. 
On the other hand, the ownership structure and corporate social responsibility 
practices, although found significant , have less impact on reducing fraudulent activities 
as these dimensions are not directly related to financial reporting. This contradicts with a 
study done in china which found that ownership structure is insignificant in reducing 
fraud (Chen & Firth, 2006). However, the results found about corporate social 
responsibility supports the study that was conducted by (Legg, 2014) stating that 
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corporate social responsibility increases consciousness among stakeholders and thus 
decreases fraud. 
To explain why good corporate governance practices is shown to have impact in 
reducing fraudulent activities , a direct association could be attributed to employees 
being engaged in corporate social responsibility activities and less dealing with 
fraudulent acts. Also, companies who are engaged in good corporate governance 
practices are likely to have employees believing in doing well to the environment and 
society so that they value ethical standards more such employees are less likely to 
involve in fraudulent activities.  
 
4.4 ANOVA 
 Analysis of variance ANOVA is used below to tests whether there is significance 
between corporate governance and fraud within the different categories of the 
demographic variables: size of the company, board size, sales, difference in sales, debt, 
and years of experience. 
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4.4.1 Size of the company and fraud 
 Table 16 and 17 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category 
of sizes of company and fraud. 
 
Table 16: Descriptive Table of the Effect of the Company’s Size on Fraud 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1-9 11 2.155 .7034 .2121 1.682 2.627 1.0 2.7 
10-19 8 2.875 .7667 .2711 2.234 3.516 1.7 3.7 
20-50 14 1.964 1.2858 .3436 1.222 2.707 1.0 4.3 
> 50 42 2.660 1.0768 .1662 2.324 2.995 1.0 4.7 
Total 75 2.479 1.0754 .1242 2.231 2.726 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 17: ANOVA of the Effect of the Company’s Size on Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 7.490 3 2.497 2.270 .088 
Within Groups 78.096 71 1.100   
Total 85.586 74    
 
 Significance is at 0.05. By using One Way ANOVA to test the effect of the 
company’s size on fraud practices, 11 companies that have 1 to 9 employees have an 
average fraud of 2.15. The average fraud increased to 2.87 as the company size 
increased to 10-19 employees. However, average fraud decreased to 1.96 as the size of 
the company increased to reach 50 employees after which fraud increased again to reach 
2.66 with a number greater than 50 employees. In general, the size of the company does 
not have a huge significance on fraud practices. Overall, small and large companies do 
not have high fraud practices relative to middle sized companies. 
Dependent variable: Fraud 
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Independent variable: Transparency of financial data, ownership structure, audit 
committee, board of directors and corporate social responsibility. 
 
4.4.2 Board size 
Table 18 and 19 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category 
of board size and fraud. 
 
Table 18:  Descriptive Table of Board Size and Fraud 
BOD 
size 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1-4 12 2.325 .9827 .2837 1.701 2.949 1.0 4.3 
5-10 35 2.491 1.1094 .1875 2.110 2.873 1.0 4.3 
>10 26 2.546 1.1427 .2241 2.085 3.008 1.0 4.7 
Total 73 2.484 1.0899 .1276 2.229 2.738 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 19: ANOVA of Board Size and Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .406 2 .203 .167 .847 
Within Groups 85.115 70 1.216   
Total 85.520 72    
 
 Companies that have 1-4 board members have an average fraud of 2.32. This 
average increased to reach 2.49 as a number of board member increased to reach to 
reach 10. As the members of the board increase to become greater than 10 members, the 
average fraud increases to become 2.54.  
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4.4.3 Sales 
 Table 20 and 21 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category of sales 
and fraud  
Table 20:  Descriptive Table of Sales and Fraud 
Sales 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
<100,000 8 2.475 .4200 .1485 2.124 2.826 1.7 2.7 
100,000-
499,000 
 
20 2.115 1.0499 .2348 1.624 2.606 1.0 4.3 
500,000-
100,0000 
8 2.600 1.1097 .3923 1.672 3.528 1.0 3.7 
>1,000,0
00 
31 2.806 1.0902 .1958 2.407 3.206 1.0 4.7 
Total 67 2.536 1.0469 .1279 2.280 2.791 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 21: ANOVA of Sales and Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5.875 3 1.958 1.856 .146 
Within Groups 66.459 63 1.055   
Total 72.334 66    
 
 Entities that have sales less than $ 1,000,000 have an average fraud of 2.47. 
However , entities that have sales between $1,000,000 and 499,000 have an average 
fraud of 2.11 Similarly, companies that have sales between $ 500,000 and $ 1,000,000 
have an average fraud of 2.6. Average fraud increases to 2.8 for the companies that have 
annual sales greater than $ 1,000,000. It is concluded that in general there is no 
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significance between the annual sales of the company and its fraud practices with 
significance less than 0.05. The increase in average fraud with an increase in sales is due 
to the different number of sample companies in each category. 
 
4.4.4 Difference in Sales and Fraud 
Table 22 and 23 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category of 
difference in sales and fraud 
Table 22: Descriptive Table of Change in Sales and Fraud 
Diff in sales 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxi
mum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
decreased 
significantly 
3 3.733 1.6743 .9667 -.426 7.893 1.8 4.7 
decreased slightly 6 3.067 .4967 .2028 2.545 3.588 2.7 3.7 
no change 14 2.586 1.1562 .3090 1.918 3.253 1.0 4.3 
increased slightly 24 2.333 .9407 .1920 1.936 2.731 1.1 4.3 
increased 
significantly 
20 2.610 1.0518 .2352 2.118 3.102 1.0 4.3 
Total 67 2.597 1.0478 .1280 2.341 2.853 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 23: ANOVA of Change in Sales and Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.871 4 1.718 1.624 .180 
Within Groups 65.588 62 1.058   
Total 72.459 66    
 
Firms that have experienced a significant decrease in sales have an average fraud 
of 3.73. However, those that experienced a slight decrease in sales have an average fraud 
of 3.06. This average decreased to 2.58 for those companies that did not experienced any 
change in sales. Companies that experienced a slight decrease in its sales have an 
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average fraud of 2.33. Finally, companies that experienced a significant increase in sales 
have an average fraud of 2.61. This means that in general there is no direct relation 
between change in sales and fraud with a significance of less than 0.05 (0.18). 
 
 4.4.5 Debt and Fraud 
Table 24 and 25 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category of Debt 
as a percentage of total assets and fraud 
Table 24: Descriptive Table of Debt and Fraud 
Debt 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1-25% 28 2.729 1.1553 .2183 2.281 3.177 1.1 4.7 
26-50% 35 2.446 1.0388 .1756 2.089 2.803 1.0 4.3 
>50% 7 1.857 .7955 .3007 1.121 2.593 1.0 2.7 
Total 70 2.500 1.0833 .1295 2.242 2.758 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 25: ANOVA of Debt and Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.459 2 2.229 1.952 .150 
Within Groups 76.521 67 1.142   
Total 80.980 69    
 
Companies that have Debt between 1 and 25% have an average fraud of 2.72. As 
the percentage of debt increases between 26 to 50%, average fraud decreases to reach 
2.44. Finally, as Debt rise above 50%, average fraud decreases till 1.77. It can be 
concluded that there is a slight significance between debt and fraud. Whenever the level 
of loans increases in the company there will be more monitoring on all the firms’ 
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activities. This will make it harder for fraud occurrence. 
  
4.4.6 Years of experience and Fraud 
Table 26 and 27 below present the ANOVA test output of the different category of years 
of experience and fraud. 
 
Table 26:  Descriptive Table of Years of Experience and Fraud 
Company’s 
age 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
<5 years 17 2.253 1.0519 .2551 1.712 2.794 1.1 4.3 
5-10 years 23 2.404 1.1507 .2399 1.907 2.902 1.0 4.7 
>10 years 35 2.637 1.0415 .1760 2.279 2.995 1.0 4.3 
Total 75 2.479 1.0754 .1242 2.231 2.726 1.0 4.7 
 
 
 
Table 27: ANOVA of Years of Experience and Fraud 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.872 2 .936 .805 .451 
Within Groups 83.714 72 1.163   
Total 85.586 74    
 
 Entities that have been operating for less than 5 years have an average fraud of 
2.25. Those that have been operating for 5 to 10 years have an average fraud of 2.40. 
The average fraud increases to 2.63 for companies that have been operating for more 
than 10 years. Even though there is an increase in the average fraud as years of 
experience increase, there is no relation between fraud and years of experience with a 
significance of less than 0.05. 
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4.5 Regression 
In this section, a regression model is constructed to further test hypotheses H1a-
H1e. The independent variables are the corporate governance scores and the dependent 
variable is the fraud score. The SPSS output is summarized in the tables below.  
 
Table 28: Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .458a .210 .153 .98814 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ADTS, OWNS, CSRS, TRSS, 
BRDS 
 
 The model summary showed a correlation coefficient of 0.458 and a correlation 
of determination of 0.210 indicating that the corporate governance dimensions explained 
an acceptable percentage of the variation in the observed fraudulent activities. 
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Table 29: Regression Analysis 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 17.927 5 3.585 3.672 .005b 
Residual 67.373 69 .976   
Total 85.300 74    
a. Dependent Variable: FRDS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ADTS, OWNS, CSRS, TRSS, BRDS 
The results of the ANOVA test for the regression model indicated that the model 
is highly significant, p-value = 0.05. Hence, corporate governance practices can be used 
as predictors of fraudulent financial reporting.   
 
Table 30: Regression Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.533 .768  7.207 .000 
TRSS .011 .213 .008 .050 .960 
OWNS -.206 .255 -.120 -.807 .422 
BRDS -.276 .317 -.174 -.869 .388 
CSRS -.151 .232 -.109 -.649 .518 
ADTS -.220 .250 -.149 -.883 .380 
 
The regression equation can be written as: 
FRDS = 5.533+0.011TRSS-0.206OWNS-0.276 BRDS-0.151CSRS-0.220ADTS 
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  Since all coefficients are negative, the regression model gives some indications 
to support H1a-H1e. However, none of these coefficients was found significant as seen 
in the p-value column of Table 30.  Independence and efficiency of the board of 
directors was found to have the highest impact on reducing fraudulent activities while 
transparency of financial reporting was found to have no impact.  
Note: when all components of corporate governance are considered, the regression 
equation did not signal out one dominant component 
 To investigate further, stepwise regression analysis was conducted. The 
computer output is shown below. The results show that a regression model with BRDS 
as the only independent variable explains most of the variations in the FRDS values, 
17.2% compared to the 21.0% for the full model.  
 
Table 31: Stepwise Regression Analysis 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .415a .172 .161 .98351 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BRDS 
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ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 14.688 1 14.688 15.185 .000b 
Residual 70.612 73 .967   
Total 85.300 74    
a. Dependent Variable: FRDS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), BRDS 
The overall model is highly significant at p=0<0.01. 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.824 .617  7.815 .000 
BRDS -.656 .168 -.415 -3.897 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: FRDS 
The model used as the BDRS as the only insignificant variable and the following 
equation came out: 
 FRDS=4.824-0.656BRDS 
The equation is significant at 0.656, so BRDS by itself can explain most of the 
variability explained by all corporate governance dimensions. 
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 Excluded Variablesa 
Model Beta In T Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 TRSS -.068b -.478 .634 -.056 .564 
OWNS -.160b -1.261 .211 -.147 .699 
CSRS -.143b -.930 .355 -.109 .482 
ADTS -.221b -1.523 .132 -.177 .528 
a. Dependent Variable: FRDS 
 
The stepwise checks if any of the excluded variables should enter. None of the variables 
were found significant since all p values are higher than 0.05. 
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Chapter V 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we present the summary of the study, conclusion, recommendation and 
future research. 
 
5.1 Summary 
 This study tested the relationship between corporate governance dimensions and 
fraud prevention. Data collected from Alumni and graduates of LAU is used in order to 
determine the relationship between corporate governance dimensions and fraud. These 
participants are currently working in Lebanese firms and are knowledgeable in the topic 
of corporate governance.  
 The results indicated that corporate governance dimensions lead to lower fraud 
occurrence. Based on an extensive literature review, the hypotheses were developed 
.Studies were used in order to suggest the study’s hypotheses. Those hypotheses were 
tested. Independent and dependent variables, measurement techniques and the sample 
size were completely described. The statistical techniques used to test the hypotheses 
include: One Way ANOVA, correlation, reliability, regression and descriptive statistics 
.First, descriptive statistics were used to test the relationship between size, board size, 
board meetings, sales, annual sales, debt, years of experience and fraud occurrence. 
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Second, the cronbach’s reliability analysis showed that the corporate governance 
dimensions and fraud were reliable which allowed for further researches.  
 Then, correlation was tested using One Way ANOVA showed that middle sized 
companies are more likely to be subject to fraud than small and large companies. There 
is a positive correlation between company size and fraud occurrence. Then, the data 
collected showed a positive relationship between board size and fraud. In addition, the 
effectiveness and independence of board of directors is the most impacting factor that 
leads to less fraud followed by the audit committee, the transparency of financial data. 
The less influential dimensions were ownership structure and corporate social 
responsibility.  
 Most of the respondents worked in companies that have more than 50 
employees. The companies have been operating in the market for more than 10 years 
and which board of directors meets more than 6 times per year. Also, the regression 
model showed that the corporate governance dimensions explained an acceptable 
percentage of the variation in the observed fraudulent activities. Hence, corporate 
governance practices can be used as predictors of fraudulent financial reporting. Finally, 
the results revealed that a regression model with board of directors’ independence and 
effectiveness as the only independent variable explains most of the variations in the 
fraud values. 
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 Nowadays, corporations focus on practicing corporate governance dimensions 
and communicating the role of its dimensions in order to reduce fraud occurrence. This 
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study was conducted to prove the relationship between audit committee, the board of 
directors, the ownership structure, transparency of financial data and corporate social 
responsibility on one hand, and fraud occurrence on the other hand. This relationship 
pushes corporations to pay more attention to corporate governance dimensions in order 
to achieve less fraud. In addition, we need more regulations of corporate governance in 
Lebanon. The results of a study conducted in Lebanon show that effective and efficient 
board of directors is the dimension that influences corporate fraud the most. Then, audit 
committee and transparency of financial data come in the second and third place. 
Corporations should have independent and effective board of directors who can take 
decisions without external influence and which contribute to diminish fraudulent 
financial reporting. Moreover, since audit committee operates under the supervision of 
board of directors, an effective board of directors will lead to an effective board of 
directors and thus to less fraud occurrence. In addition, transparency of financial data 
should be presented in companies so that stakeholders will know the actual financial 
situation and can act accordingly.  Furthermore, companies should also give attention to 
Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility in order to prevent fraud. For 
instance, companies can engage in social activities. 
 
5.3 Future Research 
 Future investigations should be done to examine the corporate governance 
dimensions efficacy on fraud occurrence. Each of the five components of corporate 
governance which are audit committee, the board of directors, the ownership structure, 
transparency of financial data and corporate social responsibility could be a separate set 
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of questionnaires based on which future researches could be conducted. Conducting a 
separate study allows getting involved in more details thus allows for a more detailed 
investigation about each separate corporate governance dimensions. In addition, this 
study should be conducted on a bigger pool of sample than the convenient one 
conducted in this research. Then, this research was limited to the Lebanese case. This 
same topic could include different countries which allow for a broader opinion thus 
permits for new research topics that aim to compare Lebanon’s case versus other 
countries.  
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Appendix “A” 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to test the relationship between corporate governance and 
fraud occurence .The questionnaire is voluntary and the data collected is strictly 
confidential. All participants will NOT be identified and you have the option not to 
answer a particular question. The data collected will be analyzed and used to identify 
any educational needs which can then be implemented as appropriate. Please note if you 
don’t know the answer or don’t want to answer a particular question then leave it blank. 
You agree to take part in this survey by completing questions below. 
 
If you have any questions, you may contact:  
Name (PI) Phone number          Email address 
Dr.Abdulnasser Kassar   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or you want to 
talk to someone outside the research, please contact the: 
 
IRB Office, 
Lebanese American University  
3rd Floor, Dorm A, Byblos Campus 
Tel: 00 961 1 786456 ext. (2546) 
  
Please tick or/ circle the appropriate answer: 
1) Your organization size:          a) 1 - 9 employees          c) 10 - 19 employees  
     b) 20 - 50 employees            d) > 50 employees 
2) Your organization’s board of directors size: 
a) 1 - 4 members;            b) 5 - 10 members;           c) > 10 members 
3) How many times does the board meet per year? 
                    a) 1 - 3 times                    b) 4 - 6 times                       c) > 6 times      
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4) CEO compensation: 
 a) < $ 50,000                      b) $ 50,000 - 99,000 $        c) $ 100,000 - 149,000         
 d) $ 150,000 - 250,000        e) > $ 250,000  
5) How often do family members who are not members of the legal board attend the 
meeting? 
                   a) Always                            b) Sometimes                           c) Never  
6) Do family members engage and participate in board decisions? 
a) Yes                                   b) No 
7) Approximately what are the sales revenues per year? 
a) < $ 100,000                b) $ 100,000 - 499,000        c) 500,000 - 1,000,000 $                         
d) > $ 1,000,000 
8) Over the past five years the average annual sales revenue has: 
a) Decreased significantly           b) Decreased slightly            c) No change                                    
d)Increased slightly                     e)Increased significantly 
 
9) Combined long term and short term debt is approximately what % of equity? 
      a) 0 - 25%                             b) 26 - 50%                                     c) > 50% 
 
10)  Qualifications: a) No degree  b) Graduate   
 
11) Specialization: a) Accounting and auditing b) Banking science  
             c) Business Administration          d)Another set 
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12) Years of experience: a) ˂ 5 years  b) 5-10 years  c) ˃ 10 years 
 
13) Professional certificate: a) CA b) CPA  c) CIA            
   d) Another set                          e) Nothing 
 
14) Age: a) ˂ 30 years  b) 30-40 years  c) ˃ 40 years 
 
15) Gender: a) Male  b) Female 
 
For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer where SD 
represents strongly disagree; D represents disagree; N represents Neutral; A 
represents agree and SA represents strongly Agree. There is an ample level of 
transparency of financial data in terms of 
 
79 
 
For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of Ownership structure and control privileges  
    
 
For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of   Structure of Board of Directors and Management in terms of  
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For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of corporate Social Responsibility in terms of 
 
For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer regarding the 
existence and effectiveness of the following elements (Auditing committee)  
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For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer related to your 
corporation 
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